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And currently, we don't. I think the recount is a great idea whether or no there were any problems.
It certainly will be interesting.
Please support .Beyond the Storm: Shadows of the Big Easy
by Magenta on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 04:46:17 AM PDT
the better, particularly if the system is broken badly.
Don't blame me, I support Dennis! http://kucinich.us
by rjones2818 on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 04:50:03 AM PDT
[ Parent ]
NH has a paper ballot system. That's a good thing. It allows recounts when they're really necessary, in really close races.
So did the old system in Florida, the one with the hanging chads. The one that was eliminated after the 2000 recount by people taking advantage of the controversy.
Kucinich is creating a controversy that will endanger NH's solid, verifiable paper ballot system.
I'll never be a cheerleader for that horseshit.
Remember the hanging chads?
After Florida, we spent millions to "reform" the voting system in America after the Media mocked the supposedly antiquated system of paper ballots in Florida. Remember the guy with the magnifying glass? We can't have that sort of foolishness intruding on our serious elections in our technologically advanced age! Let's do it all 100 percent electronically! No more paper ballots! In short, the Florida disaster became the reason for REALLY screwing up our voting system and making sure fewer election authorities had a paper trail. Millions of dollars went into touch screen systems so that by 2004 many, many states had no way of doing a legitimate recount without simply recounting "electronic ballots" electronically. Now that's a system ripe for abuse: electronic ballots with no paper trail.
So every time I see a paper ballot system such as New Hampshire's come under attack, I get kind of pissed off. Because it's this sort of controversy that results in false reform and has in the past already resulted in a less secure and more vulnerable voting system.
OK, the Diebold paper ballot counter can be hacked. That's not such a big problem considering the ballots themselves can be retrieved and hand counted. It ought to be fixed. Or maybe the state or counties should create audit procedures to guard against such hacking. Or maybe they already have. How much do you want to bet?
Whatever happened to Victoria Iseman? Seems like she just dropped off the face of the earth.
by overlander on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 05:57:23 AM PDT
this isnt a challenge to paper ballots.
This is an indictment of Diebold Optical Scanners.
"Cynicism is a sorry wisdom." - Barack Obama
by BlueGenes on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 05:59:02 AM PDT
The ballots and the scanner go together. And what system would you like to replace it with, Sherlock?
by overlander on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 06:10:57 AM PDT
but the point here is that a recall is possible. The true count is still the paper. The finger is pointed at Diebold not because their system can't be made to work or one similar to it (we have optical scanner machines in Arizona that as far as we can tell are extremely accurate) but because the possibility exists of shady tactics in that company.
If that's going on, I don't think anyone would call for a replacement of the system, simply an indictment of the people misusing it.
"I still say a church steeple with a lightning rod on top shows a lack of confidence" Doug McLeod
by artmartin on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 06:16:08 AM PDT
tabulator and we have had a few problems throughout the years.
As a matter of fact the Dem party here in Tucson just won a lawsuit to get the county to release election data over the 06 bond election.
Scanners are fine as long as they aren't hooked to a phone line and the sample recounts are done randomly.
A view from the border you need to see.
by buddabelly on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 06:41:09 AM PDT
are not hooked to a phone line.
whenever i have nothing particular to say i find myself always always plunging into cosmic philosophy or something -- archy (Don Marquis)
by mspicata on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 06:52:23 AM PDT
rechecked by a manual recount of random precincts.
by buddabelly on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 06:58:08 AM PDT
the recount is pretty much confirming the accuracy of the scanners.
by mspicata on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 09:30:42 AM PDT
Just because one set of Firestone tires doesn't fail doesn't mean there isn't a problem with any other Firestone tires.
NH does not audit to check the accuracy of their machines... a paper ballot or paper trail is meaningless in itself unless it is actually counted.
Otherwise you seem to be advocating that we have faith that the scanners are accurate. That is illogical, considering the documented mechanical and software problems that are alarmingly prevalent in such mission-critical systems.
by Spiderpig on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 02:29:04 PM PDT
It's a statement of fact.
by mspicata on Fri Jan 18, 2008 at 06:07:07 AM PDT
Watch this video to see what the problems w NH Op Scans are
by AskQuestions on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 09:26:03 AM PDT
and the memory cards are locked in the scanners. So far, the hand count is extremely close to the scanned result. There don't appear to be any memory card issues.
by mspicata on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 09:29:59 AM PDT
Watch these very NH machines be hacked before your eyes: http://youtube.com/...
The mem cards are NOT locked in the scanners (they are routinely opened and removed in the middle of elections by LHS Associates). And there don't "appear to be any memory cards issues", because there don't appear to be any memory cards!
The Sec. of State of NH has no idea where they are or what has happened to them!
by txgirl on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 10:53:41 AM PDT
the machine used in New Hampshire.
by mspicata on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 11:08:42 AM PDT
here. New Hampshire uses a Diebold OS tabulator to tote up the results in some wards. It reads paper ballots. ALL voting is done by paper. The memory cards of the NH machines are indeed locked in the scanners, under number seal.
by mspicata on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 11:14:04 AM PDT
as the ones shown in the Harri Hursti youtube video in txgirl's post above.
Used in 80% of precincts in NH - voters mark a paper ballot which is then fed into the Diebold OpScan machine, which records the votes (we hope) on an installed memory card, locked into the scanner during the voting.
After the polls close, the memory cards are taken out and delivered to the central tabulators.
There is one private,opaque company, LHS Associates, run by the guy who interrupts Hursti in the video, John Silvestro. LHS, based in Methuen MA, is the sole Diebold vendor, programmer, operator and service provider for NH and most of NE!
And the recount has revealed that some of the memory cards, given into the possession of LHS, not the Secy of State, have gone missing . . .
by AskQuestions on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 12:22:59 PM PDT
There are no central tabulators. The totals are taken down and sent by phone or fax to the Secretary of State by each Supervisor of the Checklist (who, by the way, is a locally elected official in each of the voting locations). There are 169 wards or towns with optical scanning, and 147 that hand-count. The machine shown in the video is a Diebold Accuvote-TS -- not used in New Hampshire, which uses the Accuvote-OS. If you follow the link I cited above, you'll see the difference. The memory cards are under seal in the machines, where they belong -- I confirmed that with a local official. LHS doesn't take possession of the cards. The Secretary of State doesn't either; they're kept locally until any recount is complete. Speaking as someone with auditing experience, that is exactly how it should be done. You never want to taint one information stream by introducing the stream you're comparing it with at the same time.
And this is no defense of Diebold. It's simply the facts.
by mspicata on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 12:34:06 PM PDT
Why do we keep banging our heads against the wall of inanity in diaries like this one?
The way to win is not to move to the right wing; the way to win is to move to the right policy. -- Nameless Soldier
by N in Seattle on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 12:40:55 PM PDT
reality surfaces. One hopes in vain, of course. With my auditing background, I'd already concede the validity of the result, based on the first day alone: We've got results from about 7% of the votes, with a 0.5% variance. Nearly all of that is undervoting (meaning the machine couldn't read it), and more than 50% of that is going to Clinton. There's not much chance of a significant swing.
It would be very interesting to see the results from a machine-counted town that went for Obama and from a large hand-counted town. I'll bet the hand-counted variances are larger.
by mspicata on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 12:56:50 PM PDT
Yes, the recount of hand-counting will be interesting. That's one area where the WA Gov experience won't help, as we had no votes hand-counted on the first (or second) pass through the ballots.
My suspicion is that the hand-count error rate will actually be lower than the opscan recount. That's because the preponderance of changes have been shifts from undervotes (scanner couldn't detect a mark) to votes. Humans are better than electronics at pattern recognition, especially when the humans marking the ballots don't follow instructions -- circling the name, checkmark or X in the oval, and so forth. In the case of originally hand-counted ballots, however, humans have already had the opportunity to demonstrate their ability to recognize patterns.
by N in Seattle on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 01:08:12 PM PDT
This machine is the same machine as in NH, here in this video
by AskQuestions on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 12:58:02 PM PDT
I see you're correct abouot that. I still take you back to my original link above:
The Diebold Accuvote-OS, the machine used in New Hampshire, has much of the same hardware and runs much of the same tabulation software, so these machines could conceivably be hacked. However, the incentive for hacking them is not very great, because unlike with the paperless voting, again, there's the paper trail. So if there were ever a recount—and there was after the 2004, when a survey of New Hampshire voting districts chosen by the Nader campaign showed there was virtual no difference between the scanned tabulation and the hand recount—the malfeasance would be easily discovered. Many folks immediately suspect that any election results they found surprising—and whether they know enough about local and statewide voting patterns to be surprised is always a good question—are most easily explained by malfeasance by the Diebold corporation or exploitation of its machines. There are many problems for these folks who look for the most exotic (and maybe reassuring) explanation for an election result they don't like, but in this case, let's start out with a fairly basic one: voters in every town in New Hampshire cast their vote on a paper ballot, and in more than half of the towns in New Hampshire, the paper ballots are counted by hand.
The Diebold Accuvote-OS, the machine used in New Hampshire, has much of the same hardware and runs much of the same tabulation software, so these machines could conceivably be hacked. However, the incentive for hacking them is not very great, because unlike with the paperless voting, again, there's the paper trail. So if there were ever a recount—and there was after the 2004, when a survey of New Hampshire voting districts chosen by the Nader campaign showed there was virtual no difference between the scanned tabulation and the hand recount—the malfeasance would be easily discovered.
Many folks immediately suspect that any election results they found surprising—and whether they know enough about local and statewide voting patterns to be surprised is always a good question—are most easily explained by malfeasance by the Diebold corporation or exploitation of its machines. There are many problems for these folks who look for the most exotic (and maybe reassuring) explanation for an election result they don't like, but in this case, let's start out with a fairly basic one: voters in every town in New Hampshire cast their vote on a paper ballot, and in more than half of the towns in New Hampshire, the paper ballots are counted by hand.
There's no THERE there.
by mspicata on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 01:19:45 PM PDT
if a machine is not working.
That's access. See description of this in my post below.
And according to lawyer John Bonifaz of Voter Action, some of the memory cards used in the NH primary have now gone missing . . .
by AskQuestions on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 01:07:28 PM PDT
The memory cards remain in the machines at the towns, under numerical seal. By NH State law.
by mspicata on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 01:13:02 PM PDT
It's difficult to respond when there are so many incorrect statements in a single comment. I applaud mspicata's patience, but I don't suffer fools so gladly.
by N in Seattle on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 12:56:14 PM PDT
LHS access to memory cards during the course of voting is described here:
Last-minute repairs and replacements made to voting machines by LHS in advance of, or during, elections are prime opportunities for fraud, a time when the systems are in their most vulnerable state. A now-infamous hack of the exact same machine used last week across New Hampshire in its Primary was seen in HBO's Hacking Democracy (video of hack here). The hack in Leon County, Florida, in late 2005, is seen as completely flipping the results of a mock election such that only a manual hand-count of the paper ballots would reveal the tampering that had been done to the system's memory cards. There are no routine audits or spot-checks of the state's paper ballots of the sort that would protect against the hack described above. Total Access for LHS Associates Given the sensitive vulnerability of these systems, it's troubling that in New Hampshire last week, reports indicate that LHS employees may have had regular access to memory cards and voting machines, and even replaced them during the course of the day as failures occurred. Officials I spoke with in New Hampshire were unclear whether LHS was working under any strict written security protocols other than those procedures that clerks and other officials are told to follow concerning set-up and use of the machines on Election Day. Such procedures would include the fact that town officials are told to hold the keys and open machines for LHS staff members when they arrive to make any Election Day repairs, breaking the security seals on the systems in the process of such repairs. Computer scientists we spoke with in Connecticut (where LHS also oversees Diebold voting), such as Professor Michael Fischer of Yale University's Computer Science Department and Professor Alex Shvartsman of the University of Connecticut's Voting Research Team, recommend tight written legal protections to govern the way voting machine failures are handled. Connecticut officials continue to work on problems that have arisen since they purchased the Diebold AccuVote Optical Scan machines in 2006. My interviews with New Hampshire officials, however, revealed a consistent lack of concern about security protocols that would restrict a vendor from coming in to replace parts or repair machines during all phases of elections. I followed up with a few more phone calls to New Hampshire on January 11th, and when I asked the Rochester Clerk of the Election, Cheryl Eisenberg, to go over the voting machine security protocols that would apply to LHS staffers she said, "I don't think there is anything in writing as to how the situation would be handled. We rely on them, we trust them". Her remark typifies the way Town Clerks described their relationship with LHS during my initial interviews.
Last-minute repairs and replacements made to voting machines by LHS in advance of, or during, elections are prime opportunities for fraud, a time when the systems are in their most vulnerable state. A now-infamous hack of the exact same machine used last week across New Hampshire in its Primary was seen in HBO's Hacking Democracy (video of hack here). The hack in Leon County, Florida, in late 2005, is seen as completely flipping the results of a mock election such that only a manual hand-count of the paper ballots would reveal the tampering that had been done to the system's memory cards.
There are no routine audits or spot-checks of the state's paper ballots of the sort that would protect against the hack described above.
Total Access for LHS Associates
Given the sensitive vulnerability of these systems, it's troubling that in New Hampshire last week, reports indicate that LHS employees may have had regular access to memory cards and voting machines, and even replaced them during the course of the day as failures occurred.
Officials I spoke with in New Hampshire were unclear whether LHS was working under any strict written security protocols other than those procedures that clerks and other officials are told to follow concerning set-up and use of the machines on Election Day. Such procedures would include the fact that town officials are told to hold the keys and open machines for LHS staff members when they arrive to make any Election Day repairs, breaking the security seals on the systems in the process of such repairs.
Computer scientists we spoke with in Connecticut (where LHS also oversees Diebold voting), such as Professor Michael Fischer of Yale University's Computer Science Department and Professor Alex Shvartsman of the University of Connecticut's Voting Research Team, recommend tight written legal protections to govern the way voting machine failures are handled. Connecticut officials continue to work on problems that have arisen since they purchased the Diebold AccuVote Optical Scan machines in 2006.
My interviews with New Hampshire officials, however, revealed a consistent lack of concern about security protocols that would restrict a vendor from coming in to replace parts or repair machines during all phases of elections.
I followed up with a few more phone calls to New Hampshire on January 11th, and when I asked the Rochester Clerk of the Election, Cheryl Eisenberg, to go over the voting machine security protocols that would apply to LHS staffers she said, "I don't think there is anything in writing as to how the situation would be handled. We rely on them, we trust them". Her remark typifies the way Town Clerks described their relationship with LHS during my initial interviews.
by AskQuestions on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 01:03:36 PM PDT
in that?
I have seen none; have you?
by mspicata on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 01:12:14 PM PDT
Here, in an article by Dori Smith of Talk Nation Radio submitted to Bradblog, in which she interviewed NH elections officials.
by AskQuestions on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 01:18:49 PM PDT
Where there have been a number of inaccuracies already, which I've cited here.
by mspicata on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 01:21:13 PM PDT
I've looked at that. Hanover and Exeter had mechanical problems with their machines, not with the memory cards. Manchester and Nashua each had one bad memory card in their combined twenty wards. They repaired it locally with software provided by LHS. There are no significant differences between wards in these two towns. Had a gamed piece of software been put in just one ward, we would see some inconsistency.
by mspicata on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 01:27:50 PM PDT
you keep referring to exactly one source, BradBlog, where the claims are at variance with the fact that the first counts are highly accurate. So far, we've got 99.5% accuracy, with a small number of undervotes -- exactly what would be expected.
I frankly don't even get the "memory card" issue. What do you want them for right now, when we're counting the paper ballots to compare them to the machines?
by mspicata on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 01:16:00 PM PDT
the memory card count would be final.
re the memory cards, the concerns are that employees of the private company can come in during the election itself and reprogram the cards - who knows or can say what they are doing, the level of trust NH citizens are being asked to put in a private company is huge.
And now during the recount it has emerged that some of the memory cards have going missing. This could simply be incompetence. But it doesn't inspire confidence in NH's elections system.
If voters are concerned that their votes may not have been counted, they'll lose interest in voting. Already our turnout percentage is among the lowest for democracies worldwide.
And it's all the candidates who did not come in first who have to be satisfied that the election results are accurate.
What I'd like you to accept is that the incumbents, and those closest to the power structure of the most powerful political parties, are the ones least likely to be concerned that voting methods are transparent and trustworthy, because chances are they are going to be able to remain in power even if the voting is inaccurate, full of errors.
As Thomas Jefferson said, the price of liberty is eternal vigilance.
by AskQuestions on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 01:30:44 PM PDT
what the memory cards reported -- it's a matter of record. We have the gold standard: the paper ballots. It has NOT emerged that the memory cards are missing. As I keep saying, they are kept locally -- and I have confirmed that. The count so far indicates a high level of accuracy. All prior recounts in New Hampshire have shown similar levels of accuracy.
The key here IS the paper. We have it; we can find out. Any discrepancy between the machine and the paper, by law, will be resolved in favor of the paper.
When it transpires that the results are within 0.5% of full accuracy, and that the predominant error --undervoting -- results in additional votes that are about the same percentages as those reported, will you be satisfied?
by mspicata on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 01:39:11 PM PDT
about the system. What are the points at which only the private vendor has access to materials or information? How many errors actually happen and why do they happen?
If the results are within .5% yet the methodology reveals areas of real concern - where the process is opaque or unverifiable or even just totally under the control of a private entity - then I'll be 1)concerned for democracy in NH and 2)satisfied that so many more people now understand how an elections system works and how it might be improved.
by AskQuestions on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 01:56:58 PM PDT
you're now dancing around the answer. There is a paper backup. That is neither opaque nor unverifiable. The paper is retained locally in over 250 jurisdictions until a recount is requested or the time for a recount is passed (at which point it is archived by the State), so there's no total control by a private entity.
No system -- paper, optical scan, punch card, touch screen -- is without flaws. I think that you'll find in the end that New Hampshire's system is quite dependable, even if it uses optical scanners.
by mspicata on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 05:49:07 PM PDT
in which John Silvestro of LHS interrupts Harry Hursti's testimony?
Why are you so protective of NH's system, which is administered by a private company and which uses expensive secret software and which has demonstrable security vulnerabilities - even if none of the machines were hacked in the NH primary, just the fact that they could so easily be tampered with should give you great pause.
I really don't understand why it makes you so uncomfortable when people critique the NH system in pursuit of election integrity and full confidence in the vote count.
by AskQuestions on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 06:55:05 PM PDT
Did you notice that you show no sign of understanding or responding to what mspicata said -- except that you regard it as "protective" and "uncomfortable"?
Here's a bonus question: do you suppose it would be a better coalition-building approach to gain a reputation for understanding other people's views, or misunderstanding other people's views?
by HudsonValleyMark on Fri Jan 18, 2008 at 03:51:12 AM PDT
Whenever I disagree with you, you claim or infer that I don't understand, don't know what I'm talking about.
Interesting tactic.
by AskQuestions on Fri Jan 18, 2008 at 10:39:28 AM PDT
If you don't respond to the content of the post, what do you think other people will infer?
It's not a "tactic," it's just life on earth.
by HudsonValleyMark on Fri Jan 18, 2008 at 12:26:58 PM PDT
that had anthing to do with LHS. All systems, no matter how good, require backup. New Hamphire's is the paper ballots. Through two days of review, the Diebold machines are demonstrably pretty accurate. If you are so much of a Luddite that you are unwilling to accept any machinery in our voting system, then I can't reach you.
As for your characterizations of me, I'll be the first to scream when the machines are proven to have produced results that compromised an election. Until then, trust but verify.
by mspicata on Fri Jan 18, 2008 at 04:02:01 AM PDT
Most computer professionals do not trust computers to administer elections.
Check out the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility and the US Association for Computer Machinery statements on e-voting for starters.
by AskQuestions on Fri Jan 18, 2008 at 10:36:49 AM PDT
CPSR:
Our position has and continues to be that the use of electronic voting without a paper audit trail for government elections, including municipal, state, and national elections is ill advised. Policy Statement on Internet Voting 2006 (excerpt)
Our position has and continues to be that the use of electronic voting without a paper audit trail for government elections, including municipal, state, and national elections is ill advised.
Policy Statement on Internet Voting 2006 (excerpt)
ACM:
Voting systems should also enable each voter to inspect a physical (e.g., paper) record to verify that his or her vote has been accurately cast and to serve as an independent check on the result produced and stored by the system. Making those records permanent (i.e., not based solely in computer memory) provides a means by which an accurate recount may be conducted. Policy Policy Recommendations on Electronic Voting Systems (9/04)
Voting systems should also enable each voter to inspect a physical (e.g., paper) record to verify that his or her vote has been accurately cast and to serve as an independent check on the result produced and stored by the system. Making those records permanent (i.e., not based solely in computer memory) provides a means by which an accurate recount may be conducted.
Policy Policy Recommendations on Electronic Voting Systems (9/04)
And this contradicts mspicata's position how? Or are you sitting on the press releases where these groups called for 100% hand counts?
And, by the way, what on earth would it mean for "computers to administer elections"?
You have indicated that you consider yourself well informed. In that case, it's difficult to account for this post.
by HudsonValleyMark on Fri Jan 18, 2008 at 01:02:27 PM PDT
One more point: Do you have any idea how easy it is to tamper with paper ballots? You can quickly spoil a whole bunch of ballots simply by marking a second candidate -- one of the easier ways to do it.
by mspicata on Fri Jan 18, 2008 at 04:05:17 AM PDT
And careful bi-partisan chain of custody, also transparent.
There are ways to eliminate ballot tampering and ballot box stuffing with paper ballots. They've figured out how to do it in Germany, UK, Japan, etc.
Why are you so vested in the use of secret proprietary software to count our votes?
by AskQuestions on Fri Jan 18, 2008 at 10:25:11 AM PDT
I am not. Why are you such a technophobe?
by mspicata on Fri Jan 18, 2008 at 01:01:33 PM PDT
On one hand you say how great paper ballots are because they can possibly be recounted.
On the otherhand you say that any recounting of ballots is an indictment of paper ballots.
Do you see the logical disconnect?
by BlueGenes on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 06:23:51 AM PDT
and if you want a perfect voting system, you want a touch screen system. No errors are found there, at least not ones that most of us can understand.
There was no logical reason to do this recount other than to find known imperfections.
Remember, NH was a 9-9 tie. Nine delegates each to Obama and Hillary. Hillary "won" the popular vote by three percent. Aside from Chris Matthews' bloviating, 4 percent was the largest gap I heard attributed to Obama based on exit polls. It's a fair bet that we'd be at 9-9 regardless of who won by a three or four percent gap. So from a delegate-harvesting perspective, any alleged vote-count fraud wasn't worth the trouble.
Everyone seems to agree now that we weren't looking for fraud in this recount. That can only mean we were looking for flaws in a system, flaws that can be exploited by voting system salesmen with a warehouse full of touch screen voting systems.
We might be strong enough to achieve a recount, but we're not strong enough to influence NH's next choice of a voting system. At least I'm not. So I'm not at all impressed with using the recount to destroy the credibility of a voting system that can be audited when it's really needed.
by overlander on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 06:41:36 AM PDT
the fact that it can be audidited is what makes it credible.
Obama!
by fisheye on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 06:52:35 AM PDT
it's not true because touch screen system hide their imperfections so well, while paper ballot systems have their imperfections broadcast on network and cable TV. That's why this recount hurts the credibility of the paper ballot -- because nothing so dramatic ever assails the credibility of touch screen voting.
the recount system should be used when a genuine possibility exists of changing an election's outcome, not for gratuitously advertising the error rate of a basically reliable system.
I'll change my mind when you show me a voting system with a zero percent error rate.
by overlander on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 07:01:27 AM PDT
there should be random audits to verify accuracy, IMO. Banks do it, casinos do it -- our votes should be at least as important as our money, no?
NH does not audit their machine counts, and there is no evidence that machine counts can be trusted based on many credible sources that have actually tested these electronic voting systems.
There is no system in existence with "a zero percent error rate", therefore all systems must be double checked to verify accuracy of results.
Besides, based on the high proven error rate of these systems, the only way you'd actually know there was a "genuine possibility of changing an election's outcome" would be through random audits. Which NH does not do.
by Spiderpig on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 03:03:44 PM PDT
But I see no problem assuming that NH does audit the machines because no one has linked to evidence that they do not.
You can't even put a machine in service unless you know that it works. And NH isn't stupid enough to offer a $2000 recount without testing the machines a little bit, is it? I mean, these people have some pride, don't they? Would they really put out a bunch of untested machines and hope and pray that no one will ever pay for a recount? You really believe that?
by overlander on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 08:22:07 PM PDT
New Hampshire does not have a post-election audit that checks the accuracy of the count. That's a point of vulnerability, no matter how thorough the pre-election testing.
by HudsonValleyMark on Fri Jan 18, 2008 at 03:53:53 AM PDT
by overlander on Fri Jan 18, 2008 at 06:39:01 AM PDT
Since you can't be bothered to do it yourself, here's one right off the front page of dKos, straight from the Concord Monitor.
There now. NH does not audit their machine counts to verify accuracy.
This is a point of vulnerability, because a paper trail is, in itself, not evidence of an accurate count.
You have to actually count the paper trail -- or "audit" -- to double check the results. Neither machines nor people are infallible.
by Spiderpig on Mon Jan 21, 2008 at 07:32:32 PM PDT
I know you can't prove a negative. But give me an authoritative source on this.
by overlander on Fri Jan 18, 2008 at 06:39:56 AM PDT
ElectionLine.org although it doesn't have the new New Jersey audit law yet.
You may have something else in mind -- "audit" can mean lots of things. But this is certainly one on a lot of people's minds.
by HudsonValleyMark on Fri Jan 18, 2008 at 12:17:59 PM PDT
Your position is absurd. Everything would be different right now if Obama was reported to have won NH by 4% (or 1%, or if there was an exact tie), even if it resulted in the same delegate distribution.
Rebellion keeps us always erect in the savage, formless movement of history. - Albert Camus
by mad clamor on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 06:56:14 AM PDT
Your position is absurd too.
by overlander on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 07:02:45 AM PDT
by overlander on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 07:03:15 AM PDT
You're denying that media reactions play a role in politics. Good luck with that.
by mad clamor on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 07:17:43 AM PDT
we were looking for flaws in a system, flaws that can be exploited by voting system salesmen
Very true. And whether the voters of NH end up getting exploited is entirely up to them.
You may not be strong enough to influence NH's choice of a voting system (thankfully), but either the citizens of NH are strong enough, or they don't have a democracy anyway, so it doesn't matter what kind of voting system they use.
by Free Spirit on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 08:39:52 AM PDT
We don't know if the system has only known imperfections until we recount and confirm.
If the imperfections are known, how have they been addressed?
Everyone seems to agree now that we weren't looking for fraud in this recount.
I can't speak for anybody else, but I wasn't "looking for" anything except a recount.
by Free Spirit on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 01:20:31 PM PDT
How about allowing a second ballot scanner by a publicly held, open source vendor to count the same ballots alongside the Diebold machines. If the two machines don't agree on a number (within .05%) then a hand audit of those paper ballots would automatically commence.
Scanners are ridiculously cheap and the average desktop calculator has the computing power necessary to tally votes. It's not rocket science.
The polls don't tell us how a candidate is doing; they tell us how the media is doing.
by Thumb on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 10:46:10 AM PDT
are less expensive than machine. The machines are an ongoing revenue stream for the vendors because they have to be serviced, maintained, and additional personnel hired to troubleshoot before, during, and after Election Day -- on top of costs to the county for year-round secure storage when not in use. For example, see this article from a paper in Illinois:
Hancock County Asks Feds to Investigate Election Vendor Hancock County's clerk said that escalating costs incurred by the county from an election vendor has forced him to call for a federal investigation of the firm.
Hancock County Asks Feds to Investigate Election Vendor
Hancock County's clerk said that escalating costs incurred by the county from an election vendor has forced him to call for a federal investigation of the firm.
Billions were set aside for states to purchase these shoddy pieces of crap. We would have been better served, IMHO, if those BILLIONS had gone instead toward paying higher wages for poll workers so that more people could afford to participate.
by Spiderpig on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 03:14:31 PM PDT
by rjones2818 on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 06:00:14 AM PDT
The NH has standards for auditing and reviewing its vote count, and that it does so with or without Dennis Kucinich's grandstanding?
by overlander on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 06:11:58 AM PDT
....did Kucinich have to flag the issue instead of the NH elections official(s) in charge? What indication did we have that problems were experienced before this recount was initiated?
It seems to me that you are conflating oversight/verification with rejection- and I don't think the Diarist has said anything about rejecting paper ballots, nor does anyone here that I've read so far.
Saying that to question any aspect of a paper ballot system is to argue for touchscreens is just, well......misleading, at best.
We should highlight the weaknesses in the system now, instead of waiting until this November to discover that things are f'd up, when it will be too late. We still have time to make adjustments to proceedures.
Should we pass on that because you fear any discussion will result in scrapping the paper system?
Think about it. Avoid letting fear dictate inaction.
you were sick, but now you're well again and there's work to do- vonnegut
by zzyzx on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 06:29:15 AM PDT
I don't know what NH's audit and verification procedures are. Just like everyone else here, I'm ignorant of that.
Fill me in.
by overlander on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 06:46:43 AM PDT
on this thread and others that NH DOES NOT AUDIT their machine counts.
by Spiderpig on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 03:17:10 PM PDT
You'd have to make sure the machine worked at all before you put it in service. So you'd run a test batch.
by overlander on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 06:57:36 PM PDT
between a "mandatory random audit of the machine count" which happens AFTER voting, vs. pre-testing of the machines to make sure they actually function?
Just to be sure the point sinks in, NH does not audit their machine counts to check if the machines are tabulating correctly. Pre-testing is not sufficient. All kinds of mechanical failures can still throw off the machine count. THAT is why they should be audited by a human being, who can discern things that a machine cannot.
by Spiderpig on Mon Jan 21, 2008 at 07:36:49 PM PDT
...of the process, but the way things are in the law, someone who got at least one vote has to be the one to call for a recount, and will only be refunded by the state in certain circumstances.
Otherwise, everyone would bitch about having to pay for it, and 'can't we just go to touch screens and not have to worry about these stupid recounts'?
I'd prefer Kucinich to call for and pay for a small recount like this, and doublecheck the optical scanners (which seem to have issues, surprise surprise) that read 80% of the paper ballots.
There's nothing wrong with having paper ballots, just how they're being counted.
I'm still an Edwards supporter, and a Patriots fan. Not having the best year here...
by Stymnus on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 07:01:44 AM PDT
This person doesn't strike me as sincere. Keep making your points if you want to...others are reading too, but if you are trying to engage in honest dialogue with this person, you may be wasting your time.
by Free Spirit on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 08:42:40 AM PDT
Lotta distractors being thrown in.
by Timothy J on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 09:10:43 AM PDT
i mean, what's the benefit of keeping the paper copy around if you can't actually check it?
even if it's just random machine error, you still need to do random audits to get the machines calibrated better.
your argument makes zero sense.
l'audace! l'audace! toujours l'audace!
by zeke L on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 09:27:24 AM PDT
should be routine, mandatory, and FUNDED by states. These elementary quality assurance methods are used all the time in public health research -- surely election integrity is equally as important.
"The extinction of the human race will come from its inability to EMOTIONALLY comprehend the exponential function." -- Edward Teller
by lgmcp on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 05:04:06 AM PDT
...it should be done by the Federal Government.
The IRS randomly audits our tax returns. Same principal. Every election, US Marshals should go to several dozen county courthouses and go over their votes, voter rolls, and registration proceedures.
by ManhattanMan on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 05:12:39 AM PDT
I trust our local officials FAR more than I trust an election squad from Bush's Justice Department.
by Elwood Dowd on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 05:16:06 AM PDT
Do you trust the Feds more than the local officials in deepest darkest red America?
"When the President does it, it's not illegal" - Richard Nixon, 1974; US Congress, 2008
by nightsweat on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 05:18:14 AM PDT
A random recount should hit precints that went Dem and precints that went Repub. If the results differ widely with Republican districts never reporting chicanery, audit those results. When the results differ than the local precincts, charge them with election fraud.
The true Ben Franklin quote from Poor Richard's Almanack is "Sell not virtue to purchase wealth, nor Liberty to purchase power."
by Andy30tx on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 05:23:55 AM PDT
the public-spirited people who show up to observe the audit counts.
in most place the vote count is open for anyone or any group to observe. anywhere that's not the case, fix it.
by zeke L on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 09:16:56 AM PDT
Rush Holt's bill would have designated the state auditor's office as having that responsibility.
This is consistent with quality auditing principles...the auditor should be independent of the system being audited. So...not the elections officials, but another qualified state office.
But ideally it would be more independent, because the state auditor is probably elected by the system being audited or appointed by someone who is elected by the system being audited. Independence is tricky. No easy answers.
by Free Spirit on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 08:49:41 AM PDT
Audits and recounts should always take place completely in the open. The public should always be able to monitor the process. That way you don't have to trust any one official or set of officials. You'll know it's being handled properly (or improperly, as the case may be).
-8.62, -8.05 | Feedback
by FOS on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 02:33:17 PM PDT
system would be best - you know, headed by the Chinese equivalent of Jimmy Carter . . . .
I can see that going over really well in Alabama . . .
by Roadbed Guy on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 05:23:03 AM PDT
That would go over like a lead balloon here in Alabama.
"Truth never damages a cause that is just."~~~Mohandas K. Gandhi -9.38/-6.26
by LynneK on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 05:37:18 AM PDT
didn't mean to slight anyone by ommission (blame the alphabet!)
by Roadbed Guy on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 05:52:41 AM PDT
Carter was asked why his organization couldn't monitor our elections, and his answer was simple, but sad: there are hundreds if not thousands of different methods being used nationwide.
Even something as simple as the ballot used. In New Hampshire, the same ballot was used statewide (1 each for Dems and Repubs) but in other places, a different ballot is made up for each county, some of them in different order of candidates, for instance.
It would be a HUGE challenge to have observers trained for such monitoring, and to be as effective as they might be elsewhere, where elections are usually far more uniform.
Maybe that's something that needs some attention too. A single, national ballot..
by Stymnus on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 07:05:55 AM PDT
than what Carter said.
Carter monitors elections only when invited to do so.
by corvo on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 08:03:10 AM PDT
by Free Spirit on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 01:22:55 PM PDT
A country, in all instances so far.
by corvo on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 02:04:44 PM PDT
...who in that jurisdiction should be authorized to invite him?
by Free Spirit on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 02:34:48 PM PDT
by corvo on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 03:18:30 PM PDT
by Free Spirit on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 03:19:25 PM PDT
Not unless you think the Carter Commission is either a "fox" or a "henhouse."
Carter's had the guts to cry foul on elections he was invited to monitor.
by corvo on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 04:32:31 PM PDT
You said: Carter monitors elections only when invited to do so.
I asked: By whom?
You said: By the jurisdiction holding the election.
You said: Usually the election commission.
Did you mean the Carter Commission? Invites themselves in?
by Free Spirit on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 04:50:36 PM PDT
I have better things to do that waste my time on the willfully obtuse.
by corvo on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 04:55:31 PM PDT
We're miles and miles away from the standards required in Iraq and Sudan.
--- Fight the stupid! Boycott BREAKING diaries!
by VelvetElvis on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 12:17:32 PM PDT
It could be pitched as showing them how an absolutely perfect flawless system works.
1) Outsource responsibility to a commercial company with strong and openly expressed partisan connections. 2) ... 3) A thousand year reign.
-- Either get behind Obama 100% of GTFO of DailyKos.
by DemCurious on Thu Jan 17, 2008 at 05:58:14 AM PDT
Sorry, but the entire rest of the world knows better already, even if many Americans prefer to remain in denial.
